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This paper places the modern spread of diet-related chronic disease in the
United States within the context of more than a century of innovation in
food processing technology, discovery in nutrition science, and corrective
policy measures aimed at improving public health. We ask whether the
current state of aﬀairs represents a market failure, and–if so–what might
be done about it. We argue that while today’s industrial food system
has its advantages, the asymmetric information problems inherent to this
system have resulted in a “lemons-style” breakdown in the market for pro-
cessed foods. The appropriate policy response to such situations (namely,
veriﬁable quality standards) is well known, but such policies are likely (in
the short run) to reduce proﬁts for existing large industrial producers of
food. In light of the food industry’s long history of success at regulatory
capture, we propose the formation of a new independent food standards
agency devoted to protecting the interests of the American consumer.
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11 Introduction
Americans don’t eat well. Increasingly, the American diet is being blamed
for epidemic levels of obesity, diabetes, heart disease, and even cancer (Willet,
2005). Such criticisms generally stem from the observation that relatively rapid
changes in dietary practice over the past century have been accompanied by
concurrent changes in the prevalence of “diet-related” disease. Food historian
Harvey Levenstein has observed that a rapid industrialization of the American
food system took place over roughly ﬁve decades (1880-1930), during which
the predominance of locally produced, freshly prepared, traditional meals was
largely displaced by national markets for name-brand processed foods (Leven-
stein, 1988). Though the overall eﬀects of this (still ongoing) transformation on
public health have been mixed, it is becoming increasingly apparent that cer-
tain industrial-scale food processing technologies are, in part, responsible for the
modern epidemic of diet-related chronic disease (Willet, 2005; Taubes, 2007).
This modern transformation of the American diet was driven by a series
of technological innovations that made it possible to market food products on
a scale never before possible: Expansion of railroads and the advent of the
refrigerated boxcar made long-distance transportation possible. Newly popular
national magazines made it possible to broadly promote brand name products.
And advances in food processing made it possible for entrepreneurs to design
novel food products that could withstand long-term storage and long-distance
shipping without danger of spoilage. The gains in production eﬃciency were
enormous, and this revolution in the way foods were produced and distributed
would ultimately transform the way the world eats.
Given today’s robust national market for food–with its many buyers and sell-
ers and near-universal availability of a wide selection of products–it is tempting
to view the U.S. food system as exemplifying the virtues of a competitive market-
place. Indeed, the presumption of standard economic doctrine is that in spite of
any unfortunate consequences for long-term health generated by today’s highly
processed foods, fully informed consumers will weigh these costs against their
many beneﬁts, such as price, taste, and convenience. However, this is a conjec-
ture based on doctrine; whether it is true or not is an empirical question with
signiﬁcant implications for public policy. It raises important questions concern-
ing the roles of consumer choice, technology, and markets, and, ultimately the
important policy question of what–if anything–can and should be done about
the current epidemic of diet-related disease.
This question–in short, whether the nutritional quality of the modern Ameri-
can diet should be viewed as the natural outcome of an eﬃcient market (and, de-
pending on the answer, what might be done to correct any market “imperfections”)–
is the subject of this essay. The answer we propose is somewhat novel, in that
we do not emphasize the “usual suspects” such as federal subsidies to agriculture
or the moral hazard associated with health insurance.1 Rather, we will argue
1While these “usual suspects” are sometimes mentioned in both the popular press and
the scientiﬁc literature, their impacts are thought to be small. Alston et al. (2008), for
instance, argue persuasively that U.S. agricultural subsidies, though large, result in only very
2that the market outcome we observe is the product of an asymmetric informa-
tion problem that has been exacerbated historically by the strategic actions of
food producers.
A key historical change took place with the transition from a system of disag-
gregated local food markets toward a national market with specialized produc-
tion and a long-distance distribution network: it became increasingly diﬃcult
for the typical consumer to observe the manner in which the foods he purchased
were handled and prepared. This informational wedge between consumer and
producer was exacerbated, not only by the physical distance separating mar-
ket participants, but also by new production and processing technologies that
changed nutritional quality in important ways.
It is our contention that–in certain market segments, and along certain di-
mensions of product quality–the industrial food revolution has resulted in a
market breakdown akin to Akerlof’s (1970) “lemons equilibrium,” in which–in
spite of a latent demand for nutritional quality–only low quality products are
oﬀered for sale. In order for this to be true, the following three conditions must
be met:
1. Low quality foods must be less costly (or more proﬁtable) to produce and
sell,
2. The consumer must care about nutritional quality (in the simplest sense:
he would be willing to pay more for a higher quality product), and
3. Nutritional quality must be unobservable to (or–more precisely–in practice
quality is unobserved by) the individual consumer.
With respect to the industrial food system, the ﬁrst condition is easy to con-
ﬁrm and not controversial. The second is sometimes minimized, with the ob-
servation that consumers seem to care more about palatability or convenience
than about the health consequences of dietary choice. But this observation is
(strictly speaking) irrelevant to establishing that consumers care about nutrition
as an independent quality in their diets (Lancaster, 1966), and is also belied by
historical events (detailed below) in which sudden and dramatic shifts in the
composition of the American diet have been driven largely by health concerns.
The third condition is perhaps the most misunderstood, and deserves the
most scrutiny. To say that a particular quality is unobserved by the consumer
is a description of a market outcome. For example, the consumer might care
about the vitamin content of the various brands of canned tomato sauce he
contemplates purchasing, but the cost of actually measuring vitamin concentra-
tions might exceed the marginal beneﬁt of being more fully informed. There
are many factors that aﬀect the practicality and cost of such veriﬁcation (e.g.,
the existence of labeling standards, the cost of laboratory analysis, prohibitions
on false claims by producers, and the sophistication of the consumer, to name a
small distortions of the retail market. Rashad and Markowitz (2007) and Smith et al. (2009)
provide estimates of the moral hazard eﬀect of health insurance on health outcomes (obesity
and weight gain, respectively); both ﬁnd it to be negligible.
3few) and many of these are themselves market outcomes (Table 1). Indeed, in
the history of American food we present below, it will become apparent that the
consumer’s relatively high quality veriﬁcation cost, as well as certain strategic
manipulations of that cost by food-producing ﬁrms, have played a key role in
the evolving nutritional quality of the American diet.
The paper proceeds as follows: ﬁrst, we review the early history of the
modern transformation of the American diet, in which food safety and vitamin
content became important public health concerns. This history illustrates the
role played by asymmetric information in the struggle to address these concerns
in early 20th century America. Second, we consider–again in historical context–
two dimensions of dietary quality (fatty acid composition and glycemic eﬀects)
that are thought to have important implications for public health today, and
which we argue are also strongly inﬂuenced by asymmetric information with
respect to product quality. We conclude with a discussion of implications for
public policy.
2 Early History of Industrial Food
2.1 Mass Production and Industry Consolidation
As compared to the traditional methods of food preparation and delivery avail-
able in 1900, the eﬃciencies of large-scale food production were impressive.
Taking advantage of the westward expansion of the railroads in the late 1800s,
entrepreneurs looking to market food products on a national scale could take
advantage of lower production costs induced both by the resulting shift in agri-
cultural production to the most productive regions of the country, but also by
the considerable economies of scale in food processing. In 1879, for example,
Gustavus Swift developed a system that allowed beef to be fattened and slaugh-
tered in Chicago, then shipped east in refrigerated railroad cars fresh, dressed,
and cheaper than beef on the hoof. By the mid-1880s it was said that the
“Golden Age of American Beef” had arrived (Levenstein, 1988).2 Similarly, the
advent of the roller mill in 1870 made white ﬂour aﬀordable for working class
households, with the nominal price dropping 56 percent between 1872 and 1897
(Davidson and Passmore, 1963).
The combination of economies of scale and falling prices made conditions
ripe for market consolidation in these new national food markets. Swift joined
with P. D. Armour and other large Midwestern meat packers to absorb or drive
out of business a host of other packers, so that by 1905 the four largest pack-
ers slaughtered nearly 50 percent of the country’s beef cattle, enough to make
price-ﬁxing agreements proﬁtable (Chandler, 1962). Similarly, in the market for
crackers and biscuits, a series of mergers by the large manufacturers ultimately
led to the formation of the gigantic National Biscuit Company (known today
as Nabisco), which accounted for 70 percent of national sales (Panschar, 1956,
pp. 82–83). Washburn-Crosby (makers of “Gold Medal Flour”) and Pillsbury
2This and other historical events relevant to our thesis are listed in Table 2.
4came to dominate the ﬂour milling industry. And in what would become a
classic oligopoly, the Havermeyer family modeled the newly formed American
Sugar Reﬁning Company (maker of “Domino” brand white sugar) on John D.
Rockefeller’s Standard Oil trust (Eichler, 1969; Levenstein, 1988). Arguably,
the predominance of proprietary brand names in these new national markets
provided perhaps the most important and–in the long run–persistent source of
proﬁts. The canning and pickling industry was particularly notable in this re-
gard, with names such as Heinz and Franco-American dominating the market.
The price premiums commanded by these early producers facilitated invest-
ment in aggressive promotional campaigns and provided incentive for further
innovation in processing technologies, advantages not shared by producers of
traditional (and hence non-proprietary) foods (Eichler, 1969; Levenstein, 1988).
2.2 Food Safety as Hidden Quality
An important consequence of the move to centralized production in agriculture
and food processing quickly emerged. Though consumers had begun to rely
upon the reputations of brand name producers to signal quality, many aspects
of production could not be observed directly by the consumer. The problems
this asymmetry of information spawned were brought into stark relief with the
1906 publication of Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, a ﬁctionalized exposé of the
meatpacking business. Sinclair’s vivid descriptions of the unhygienic conditions
and chemical adulterants employed in slaughterhouses and processing plants
struck a nerve with the American public, and the ensuing outrage eventually
resulted in the passage of the federal Meat Inspection Act and the Pure Food
and Drug Act later that year (Levenstein, 1988).
It is important to place these events in the context of economic theory. The
conditions described by Sinclair were plausible (and indeed, evidently common-
place in some quarters) because they were largely unobservable to the individual
consumer. For instance, poor hygiene on the factory ﬂoor could be compensated
for by heat treatment or the addition of chemical sterilizers, often with little
eﬀect on the taste or appearance of the product. But consumers were under-
standably troubled by the notion that chemical poisons or rats or even human
body parts might have found their way into the can of corned beef on the grocery
store shelf. To the extent that such things remained invisible to the consumer,
however, moral hazard (i.e., the absence of incentive for the individual proces-
sor to take precautionary measures) and adverse selection (i.e., the tendency of
those processors with the lowest
costs–and hence, presumably, the worst practices–to dominate the market)
would be expected to drive the market toward a uniformly low standard of
quality (Akerlof, 1970).
The issue of food safety provides a context for considering more closely the
issue of unobserved quality. In economic theory, the distinction is sometimes
made between search qualities, which are observed by the consumer before he
makes his purchase (though perhaps after paying a small “search cost” such as
traveling to the point of purchase), experience qualities, which are observed only
5after purchase (but before subsequent repeat purchases), and credence qualities,
which are never observed by the consumer (Nelson, 1970; Darby and Karni,
1973).3 These categories can be thought of as representing special cases of
market outcomes characterized by increasing quality veriﬁcation costs. If the
cost of verifying quality prior to purchase is suﬃciently low, the consumer will
choose to pay this cost (making the quality in question a search quality).4 If the
veriﬁcation cost is prohibitively high prior to purchase but suﬃciently low after
purchase, an experience quality results. But if veriﬁcation is either technically
infeasible or the veriﬁcation cost is prohibitively high relative to the potential
beneﬁt, a credence quality results.
As noted above, market participants can take actions that aﬀect the con-
sumer’s quality veriﬁcation cost. Consider, for example, the consumer consid-
ering the purchase of a can of Brand X corned beef in 1906. If he is concerned
that the can might contain toxins or pathogens that would cause him to fall ill,
there are a number of ways he could obtain this information. Visual or olfactory
inspection might settle the matter immediately. If not, he could purchase the
product, eat it (or perhaps feed it to his dog) and weigh any ensuing health
eﬀects in future purchase decisions.5 Alternatively, he could ask his friends and
neighbors what they know of the product, or pay a laboratory to test for poi-
sons, or hire an investigator to research the safety record of the producer. Any
of these actions might be thought of as paying a veriﬁcation cost that, once paid,
allows the consumer to infer product-speciﬁc quality and to make subsequent
purchase decisions accordingly.
The typical consumer, of course, is likely to have little knowledge of indus-
trial food processing practices–much less their speciﬁc eﬀects on the probability
of illness–and no feasible way of obtaining such knowledge. This could limit the
value of engaging in any of the above-mentioned methods of product-speciﬁc
quality investigation. Nevertheless, if the primary concern is non-fatal food-
induced illness, it might seem that experience could be a useful guide: simply
consume the product (perhaps repeatedly) until it causes illness. But even such
direct investigation will be of limited value if the product in question is con-
sumed jointly with other foods or the health eﬀects are suﬃciently delayed so
as to make the speciﬁc causal agent uncertain. Indeed, these are precisely the
conditions speciﬁed by Darby and Karni (1973) in their pioneering study, in
which they noted that “Credence qualities arise whenever a good is utilized...in
combination with other goods of uncertain properties to produce measurable
output.” Though the archetypal example employed by the authors was automo-
bile repair services (in which the measurable output is operability), their words
also seem an apt description of the consumer’s diet problem, in which many in-
3For a recent review of the theoretical literature on credence goods, see Dulleck and Ker-
schbamer (2006).
4It should be noted that for our purposes, the distinction between “search cost” and “quality
veriﬁcation cost” is unimportant. As commonly used, a search cost is simply the cost of
veriﬁcation of a particular type of product quality, usually either price or existence of the
product.
5This assumes product quality is consistent over time.
6puts (foods) contribute to a single output (health).6 Indeed, even public health
authorities can have diﬃculty tracing an outbreak of food poisoning back to its
particular source. In 1906, this problem was evidently severe enough to jus-
tify the institution of the minimum quality standards and veriﬁcation systems
dictated by the new federal legislation.
Though problems with unobserved quality may have damaged the credibility
of the large food processors in 1906 (indeed, this is evidently why passage of the
new federal laws was ultimately supported by the likes of the large meatpackers
and canning mogul H. J. Heinz), the newly aroused suspicions of the populace
also presented an opportunity. It is well known that when quality veriﬁcation is
costly in otherwise competitive markets, multiple equilibria will exist (Braver-
man, 1980).7 A seller in this case has good incentive to take steps to increase the
likelihood that his product is trusted by the consumer and consequently com-
mands a price premium (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Robert and Stahl, 1993).
And indeed, there was ﬁerce competition in this regard, with Heinz sponsoring
an ad campaign proclaiming its mincemeat to be “the exempliﬁcation of purity”
because it was prepared “by neat uniformed workers” in “model kitchens” which
were always open to visitors; while Franco-American Foods likewise declared
its kitchens “always open to visitors;” and Blue Label Food Products promised
that the “rich natural ﬂavor” of their products stemmed from preparation “in
clean kitchens under sanitary conditions.” Similarly, aggressive and highly suc-
cessful advertising campaigns by American Sugar Reﬁning Company and by
cereal products makers Kellogg’s (“Corn Flakes”) and Post (“Grape Nuts” and
“Toasties”) proclaimed the healthfulness and cleanliness of their products. Iron-
ically, the collective eﬀect of this stirring of the hysteria over “germs” (bacteria
having been discovered in the 1880s) may have been to drive consumers even
further toward the consumption of manufactured foods, and away from more
“unhygienic” traditionally prepared cuisine (Levenstein, 1988, pp. 32–40).
6Consumer advocate Arthur Kallet made this point quite directly many years earlier in a
discussion of the perils of consuming canned foods: “Most of the poisons introduced into our
food supply act slowly and indeﬁnitely, and their results can seldom be traced to the source.
There is therefore no particular compulsion upon producers to eliminate them” (Kallet, 1934,
p. 31). The importance of time lag between dietary modiﬁcation and health outcome is
underscored dramatically by Diamond’s (2003) observation that in the numerous “natural
experiments” around the world in which traditional food cultures have been suddenly displaced
by the Western diet, the onset of diabetes nearly always follows, but only after the passage of
18-22 years.
7As an alternative to our nomenclature in which non-negligible “quality veriﬁcation costs”
yield “multiple equilibria,” this reluctance of the consumer to change his diet can be captured
more concisely with a single word: habit. While this descriptor may be more consistent with
the subjective reports of consumers, we emphasize the costly information framework because
it suggests environmental parameters–such as the opportunity cost of time, education, and
ease of access to information–upon which the strength of habits might be expected to depend.
For extended discussions of the proposition that habits might be an optimal response to costly
search, see, e.g., Becker (1996), Smith (2004), or Smith and Tasnádi (2007).
72.3 A New Concern: Vitamin Degradation in Processing
Among the many novel foods adopted during this period were a variety of new
alternatives to breastfeeding for infants. Convenient, inexpensive, and widely
promoted as healthier for babies than mother’s milk, the use of proprietary
canned milk products or powdered “formula” mixtures was widespread by 1890
(Levenstein, 1988, p. 123). At the same time, however, some pediatricians
began to note an increased rate of infant mortality among babies fed exclusively
on these products. By 1911 suﬃcient evidence had accumulated to compel the
journal Pediatrics to editorialize about this “sinister coincidence” (American
Pediatric Society, 1911).
Today we know that heat treatment causes many of the vitamins in milk and
other processed foods to degrade, and historians now point to the new feeding
practices as the most likely cause for the epidemics of infantile scurvy (caused
by Vitamin C deﬁciency) and rickets (caused by Vitamin D deﬁciency) reported
during this period. At the time, however, the leading scientiﬁc theory (known as
the “New Nutrition”) was that developed by Baron Justus von Liebig, which held
that the only nutrients of any importance in food were protein, carbohydrate,
and fat. The ﬁrst vitamin was not discovered until 1912, and reliable methods of
quantifying vitamins in food were not available until the late 1920s (Levenstein,
1993).
During this period of scientiﬁc uncertainty, it may be informative to consider
the role of food producers in inﬂuencing the debate. The ﬁrst great commercial
success, known as Liebig’s Soluble Food for Babies, introduced in the United
States as early as 1869, bore the imprimatur of the great scientist, and claimed
to be nutritionally identical to breast milk–which it was, as far as anyone knew
at the time. This was followed by a host of imitators, the most successful of
which was the powdered Mellin’s Food, whose advertisements claimed it was
“the genuine Liebig’s Food,” and featured photographs of the chubby “Mellin’s
babies” (which became as well known as the Gerber babies of later years), often
accompanied by a testimonial thanking Mellin’s for saving apparently doomed
babies’ lives. Free samples were often sent to likely customers (primarily readers
of middle class magazines), as were free handbooks on infant care and feeding,
which explained the chemistry of infant feeding in clear but relatively sophis-
ticated language (Levenstein, 1988, pp. 123–124). It is hardly surprising that
ﬁrms would tout the latest in scientiﬁc ﬁndings when it supported purchase of
their products, but their success in making believers of mothers (not to mention
their doctors, who read the same magazines) is notable.
As the evidence against artiﬁcial feeding accumulated, the eminent pediatri-
cians who attempted to sound the alarm found it exceedingly diﬃcult to alter
what had become the conventional wisdom. Indeed, in many instances their
criticisms of proprietary infant foods were paired with equally withering con-
demnations of general medical practitioners for continuing to recommend these
foods.8 Even the 1911 Pediatrics (“sinister coincidence”) editorial on condensed
8“The average practitioner does not care to give much time and study to infant feeding
and readily accepts and prescribes formulas that the proprietary food manufacturers print on
8milk conceded that change was unlikely since “breast feeding seems to be falling
more and more into disfavor,” making it critical that “the most eﬃcient substi-
tute...be sought.” The popularity of proprietary milk substitutes was driven by
advertising campaigns that reﬂected the current scientiﬁc consensus, which in
eﬀect provided the consumer (and her doctor) with costless information about
product quality. When new evidence refuting these early claims became avail-
able, no producer had any incentive to disseminate this information. Thus, for
many years American mothers would be largely unaware of the evidence against
artiﬁcial feeding.9
The problem of vitamin degradation was not limited to the new infant foods.
The steam canning of meats and produce induced similar changes, as did the
milling of white ﬂour, from which the (vitamin-rich) germ and (ﬁber-rich) bran
could now be removed with ever-increasing eﬃciency.10 Like the use of pro-
prietary infant foods, the widespread adoption of processed foods by the larger
population is also thought to have had important consequences for public health.
In 1907, the ﬁrst systematic description of pellagra (a potentially fatal disease
now known to be caused by niacin deﬁciency) was published in the Journal
of the American Medical Association. Within months, thousands of cases had
been diagnosed, but an eﬀective treatment (via dietary modiﬁcation) was not
identiﬁed until 1914, and the speciﬁc cause (insuﬃcient niacin in the diet) was
not known until 1937 (Kiple and Ornelas, 2000).
Again during this period of scientiﬁc uncertainty, nutrition-related claims
by purveyors of proprietary foods were widespread, and contrary information
was slow to be discovered and disseminated. Examples included Fleishman’s
Yeast, which, called its yeast cakes “the richest known source of water-soluble
vitamin,” and claimed in advertisements that consumption of two to four cakes
per day would rid the body of “poisonous waste matter,” clear up skin disorders,
and correct “run-down conditions,” indigestion, and constipation; Welch’s Grape
Juice ads promised that the sweetened beverage would provide “the laxative
properties you cannot do without”; while Cream of Wheat turned its lack of
nutrients and ﬁber to its advantage by proclaiming that it contained “none of
the harsh, indigestible parts of the grain” (Levenstein, 1988, pp.153–159).
The growing consumer interest in–and skepticism about–the nutritional qual-
ity of processed foods led to the employment of leading nutrition scientists and
advocates–some of whom had previously been vocal critics of processed foods–
by the national magazines and large food processors. Dr. Harvey Wiley, for
instance, was widely known as the “pure foods” advocate instrumental to the
passage of the 1906 legislation and had declared at the end of World War I that
wartime experience supported the use of foods that were “simple and as close to
the label for him,” wrote one pediatrican in 1905 (Levenstein, 1988, p. 125).
9It is worth noting that this outcome is a natural consequence of the public goods na-
ture of information, together with the dispersed resources of consumers and the concentrated
resources of producers.
10Processing was not the only culprit in these unseen nutritional alterations. Iceberg lettuce,
a new variety introduced in 1903, was called “virtually indestructible,” and could be shipped
long distances without bruising or wilting (Levenstein, 1988). Unfortunately, much of the
nutrient content had also been bred out (Table 3).
9nature as possible,” predicting a new era of simple cooking and less processing.
By 1928, however, Dr. Wiley was perhaps best known for his work as a health
columnist for Good Housekeeping magazine, in which capacity he assured read-
ers that “Only those foods which have been fully investigated and found to be
worthy are admitted to Good Housekeeping advertising columns.” These foods,
produced in the days before vitamin fortiﬁcation, included many products (such
as Jell-O) of dubious nutritional quality, which were nevertheless awarded the
Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval. Similarly, Dr. Elmer McCollum–who in
1928 had warned that white ﬂour had been deprived of most of its vitamin
content–was hired in 1930 by General Mills to promote its use. In 1934 Mc-
Collum participated in a star-studded radio special hosted by Betty Crocker (a
ﬁctional character created by General Mills for the purpose of promoting the
consumption of baked goods), in which he assured listeners white bread was a
healthful diet food; and in 1935 he wrote a well-publicized letter to Congress
denouncing “the pernicious teachings of food faddists who have sought to make
people afraid of white-ﬂour bread.” In 1938 McCollum received an award from
the Grocery Manufacturers Association for his contributions to knowledge of
food (Schlink, 1935; Levenstein, 1993, pp. 15–22).
There are several lessons to be drawn from this critical period in the history
of the American diet. First, the nature of the early marketing campaigns–and
their phenomenal success in transforming American dietary habits–make clear
that the role of diet in promoting health (or preventing illness) has long been a
central concern of the American consumer. The powerful combination of well-
funded promotional campaigns with scientiﬁc evidence of nutritional superiority
increased the consumption of processed foods and made national brand name
foods ubiquitous in American kitchens.
A second lesson stems from the belated discovery of nutritional deﬁciencies
in newly developed food products. Because vitamins remained undiscovered
for decades as the new food processing technologies were developed, it should
not be surprising that vitamin content would be systematically (if unknow-
ingly) sacriﬁced as new products were being optimized with respect to qualities
that impacted either consumer acceptance or the costs of production and dis-
tribution. Even as evidence began to accumulate that vitamin deﬁciency was
becoming an important public health problem, there existed little incentive for
the individual producer to make adjustments to processing methods that would
increase costs but aﬀect only (credence) qualities that would be unobservable to
the consumer. In other words, conditions favoring a “lemons” outcome persisted
in the market for processed foods.
A third, deeper lesson is to be found in the defensive public relations cam-
paigns mounted by the large food processors as evidence of nutritional deﬁ-
ciencies accumulated. By investing in the dissemination of seemingly credible
messages about the quality of their products, the processors engaged in what
is technically known as obfuscation. The net eﬀect of obfuscation is to increase
quality veriﬁcation costs for the consumer (Verbeke, 2005; Gabaix and Laibson,
2006; Ellison and Wolitzky, 2009; Stivers, 2009). Though many experts were be-
ginning to sound the alarm about the various nutritional deﬁciencies induced by
10food processing, the prominent presence of similar-sounding (and rarely demon-
strably false) proclamations on the other side made it diﬃcult for the ordinary
consumer to know which products were, in fact, nutritionally superior. As noted
above, this problem was exacerbated by the fact that the nutritionally-superior
alternatives (minimally processed traditional foods) were non-proprietary, and
therefore enjoyed no market-based mechanism for providing information about
emerging scientiﬁc evidence.
Economic theory provides a relatively clear-cut solution to information-based
market breakdowns: quality grades or certiﬁcations, validated by a credible
third party. As long as the size of the market failure is large enough to justify
administrative costs, a grading system can restore the market for high-quality
goods or services, in a manner that increases allocative eﬃciency (Teisl and Roe,
1998). And indeed, this is exactly what was proposed for processed foods in the
early 1930s. But in practice, there are necessarily large distributional eﬀects of
any such grading system, and the political debate over the proposed new rules
was ferocious.
2.4 The Political Economy of Product Information: Dif-
fering Views on Quality Standards
The product of the large, nationally advertising...canners is for the
most part of mediocre quality; and this must be so, since the scale
of their output does not permit them to select from the best...The
companies have naturally resisted eﬀorts to have all cans carry a
grade mark indicating the quality of the contents. Imagine the eﬀect
on Del Monte advertising and prices, for example, of B and C grade
marks on Del Monte cans.
(Arthur Kallet (1934, pp. 31–32))
As public skepticism about the safety and nutritional quality of canned
goods grew in the 1920s, industry-wide demand for these products began to de-
cline. An important source of this public perception was the revelation that un-
scrupulous fringe producers would sometimes employ dangerous chemical adul-
terants in the canning process. A coalition of the largest canners prevailed upon
Congress to provide a legislative remedy in the form of the 1930 McNary-Mapes
Amendment to the Food and Drugs Act, which established a minimum quality
standard for canned goods, and a mandatory label (“Below U.S. Standard Low
Quality But Not Illegal”) for edible products that failed to meet the standard
(Lamb, 1936, p. 178).
The minimum quality standard prescribed in the McNary-Mapes Amend-
ment naturally led to the idea that the establishment of grades for higher-quality
canned fruits and vegetables could further improve transparency in the market-
place. In 1933, such a system–which would have mandated the use of A-B-C
grades on canned food labels–was proposed by Assistant Secretary of Agricul-
ture Rexford Tugwell. Enthusiastic support for the proposal was quickly voiced
11by a long list of consumer groups,11 as well as by the Tri-State Packers’ As-
sociation, a coalition of small canners located in New Jersey, Delaware, and
Maryland (Lamb, 1936, p. 181).
Opposition to the new mandatory grades, however, was ﬁerce. Opponents
prominently included the 650-member National Canners Association (whose
members were reportedly responsible for the production of 60% of all canned
food except milk). The principle spokesman for the opposition at the congres-
sional hearings, however, was not a canner but a publisher. By the mid-1930s,
the food industry had become the single largest source of advertising revenue for
the mass circulation magazines, and after some initial dissent–in which the ed-
itorial boards of both Ladies’ Home Journal and Good Housekeeping magazine
voiced support for the new grading system before being forced into embarrass-
ing reversals–the publishers came out against the new regulations (Levenstein,
1993, p. 18). At the Senate hearings on the proposed legislation, Mr. Charles
Coolidge Parlin appeared, representing 150 magazines with an aggregate cir-
culation of some 50 million. Mr. Parlin claimed to be the “mouthpiece for
consumers,” on whose behalf he protested the quality grading provisions of the
bill (Lamb, 1936, p. 180).
It is not diﬃcult to see that these positions represented the economic in-
terests of large producers. A system of transparent, meaningful quality grades
would dramatically reduce quality veriﬁcation costs for the typical consumer
and facilitate price competition at each grade level. This would clearly beneﬁt
the consumer, who would enjoy both the lower prices induced by greater com-
petition and the opportunity to purchase veriﬁably higher quality canned food
products. The small canner, likewise, would likely ﬁnd market niches at high
levels of quality in which the largest producers would be at a relative disadvan-
tage. In the absence of such a system, consumers would be forced to continue to
rely on brand reputation as the implicit guarantor of experience qualities, and
would continue to pay the concomitant price premium. 12 When the bill ﬁnally
passed after years of contentious debate, the tiered system of quality grades had
been dropped, leaving consumers with only the single minimum quality stan-
dard (which the National Canners’ Association continued to support) in the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938.13
11According to Lamb (1936, p. 183), those testifying at the public hearings in support of
the new canning code included representatives of the American Home Economics Association,
National League of Women Voters, General Federation of Women’s Clubs, National Council
of Women, American Association of University Women, American Federation of Labor, and
Consumers’ Research.
12Evidence in support of the notion that brands signal food safety even today can be found
in the fact that most major food safety incidents are attributable not to particular brands,
but rather to commodity-level inputs. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
for instance, reported four occurrences of food contamination or adulteration in 2008 that
warranted nationwide alerts, three of which (dairy, jalapeño peppers, and peanut butter)
occurred at the commodity level. The fourth might be considered the exception that proves
the rule: a salmonella outbreak was traced back to cereal products marketed under the Malt-
O-Meal label, which are promoted as low-cost (and less-advertised) alternatives to the major
national brands (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009).
13Those who doubt that obfuscation was a primary objective of the large canners need look
12Even as it was happening, the 1930s debate over the canners’ code was not
unique. A similar debate played out (mostly at the state and local levels) over
the pasteurization of milk. Pasteurization ensures that fresh milk can be stored
under refrigeration for extended periods of time without spoilage, and can pre-
vent food-borne disease. But pasteurization is not the only option: milk can
also be made safe by a combination of careful attention to hygiene during pro-
duction and rapid distribution to the consumer. Shortly after the advent of
commercial pasteurization in 1890, the Certiﬁed Milk movement began, led by
H.I. Coit, who advocated against pasteurization because of its impact on both
taste and nutritional value–though the latter claim was relatively unfounded at
the time (Jay et al., 2005). Nevertheless, local laws requiring pasteurization
were enacted in many localities, beginning with New York City in 1910 (Lev-
enstein, 1988). The debate over whether to require pasteurization (as opposed
to certiﬁcation) to ensure the safety of fresh milk continued into the late 1930s,
when a public relations campaign sponsored by large milk producers succeeded
in establishing a widespread belief that raw milk is never safe to drink. Many
states subsequently banned the sale of unpasteurized milk completely, making
pasteurization the norm for interstate commerce (Schmid, 2009). The parallels
to the canners’ debate are striking: once again largest national players (primar-
ily the National Dairy Products Company–later re-named Kraft–and the Borden
Company, who together controlled large shares of most urban markets) fought
to prevent institution of all but the minimum quality standard required for safe
industrial-scale production (Till, 1938). Note that again, the policy outcome
(mandatory pasteurization) eliminated potential competition from niche pro-
ducers of high-quality product (raw milk produced under sanitary conditions).
no further than an episode during the regulatory debate in which the industry was required
to propose a quality grading system. The “comprehensive system of descriptive labeling” they
proposed is exempliﬁed by the following requirements for cream-style corn (as reported in
Lamb (1936, p. 185)):
1. Description of texture as “Not Tender,” “Firm, Not Tough,” “Medium Tender or “Very
Tender”;
2. Statement of the degree of freedom from dark kernels, cob, husk or silk, as “To a High
Degree Free from Dark Kernels, Cob, Husk, or Silk” (a statement of this descriptive
element shall not be required for any product meeting this highest requirement, but
the use of such descriptive statement shall be optional with the packer), “Practically
Free from Dark Kernels, Cob, Husk, or Silk”; or “Reasonably Free from Dark Kernels,
Cob, Husk, or Silk”;
3. Statement of the consistency of the product as “Very Thick Pack,” “Thin Pack,” or
“Creamy Pack”;
4. Speciﬁcation of the sugar content or sweetness of the product, as “Very Sweet,” “Medium
Sweet,” “Slightly Sweet” or “No Added Sugar.”
133 Does Hidden Quality Matter Today? Further
Progress in Nutritional Epidemiology
Happily, the advent of vitamin fortiﬁcation (the ﬁrst federal standard for “en-
riched” white ﬂour was issued in 1941) largely eliminated the worst of the
“diseases of malnutrition” (primarily pellagra, scurvy, and rickets), and ame-
liorated much of the public concern over the nutritional quality of mass-market
foods. But the “hidden quality” problem in these foods would persist. New
micronutrients–again, typically found to be inadvertently removed by food processing–
continue to be discovered even today (see, e.g., Liu (2004) and Rao and Rao
(2007)), and the federal standard for enriched ﬂour was amended as recently as
1998 (to include folic acid, a dearth of which is thought to cause birth defects)
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2004). At the same time, changes
in product formulation have made it increasingly diﬃcult for the average con-
sumer to distinguish high quality from low quality food products. Consider,
for example, the sensory cues the consumer might rely upon to make infer-
ences about the quality of a fresh tomato: he can visually observe blemishes
or bruises, he can take a whiﬀ and know whether the product is suﬃciently
(or overly) ripened, and–perhaps after making the purchase–he can take a bite
as ﬁnal conﬁrmation of the quality of the fruit in his hand. Once this same
tomato is processed and placed in a can–perhaps along with salt, sugar, and
other additives–verifying the quality of the product and the nature of
the processing it has undergone become much more diﬃcult.
For many years, the extent to which processing could be used to mask the
presence of low-quality ingredients or products was limited by a strong “im-
itation” provision in the 1938 legislation. A can of tomato sauce, for exam-
ple, produced using methods or ingredients that signiﬁcantly departed from
traditional practice could only be sold if clearly labeled as “imitation tomato
sauce.” This provided a strong incentive for producers to avoid exotic prod-
uct re-formulations that might trigger the rule. In 1973, however, the Food
and Drug Administration–in a move reportedly endorsed by the large food
processors–issued a regulation repealing the 1938 rule (Lyons, 1973).14 This
seemingly minor regulatory change has been blamed by some as contributing
to the dramatic subsequent rise in diet-related illness (Pollan, 2008). Today
there are more than 3,000 additives (many of which alter ﬂavor, appearance,
or tactile properties) used in processed foods sold in the U.S. (Food and Drug
Administration, 2009).15
Another way in which the food industry seems to have acted to make quality
veriﬁcation diﬃcult for the consumer is the modern practice of barring the pub-
lic from production facilities. Gone are the days in which the largest processors
14Ironically, the change was also supported by the American Heart Association, on the
grounds that it would facilitate the reformulation of many foods to reduce levels of saturated
fat.
15Some of these additives–notably, artiﬁcial sweeteners–have been approved for use despite
suggestive evidence of acute negative health eﬀects. Iuliano (2010) suggests that producers of
proprietary sweeteners had undue inﬂuence on the FDA approval process.
14proudly opened wide their “model kitchens.” A number of prominent journal-
ists have published exposés on the American food industry in recent years (e.g.,
Schlosser (2001); Pollan (2006); Simon (2006)), and–though their speciﬁc tar-
get industries, production processes, and issues have varied–they speak as with
one voice on the subject of industry secrecy. Filmmaker Robert Kenner, for
instance, has described how in making the documentary Food, Inc. he set out
to make a ﬁlm about the divergent opinions on the industrial food system, but–
after being repeatedly denied access to the companies he sought to ﬁlm, and
meeting employees or subcontractors of these companies who were afraid to
speak on camera or even to tell him their own personal eating habits–the ﬁlm
wound up focusing mostly on issues of free speech and access to information
(Kenner, 2009). Industry representatives have argued that such secrecy pre-
vents “unnecessary” fear or panic on the part of consumers, but such claims are
undermined by incidents like Kenner’s discovery that chicken growers contracted
by Purdue were feeding their birds arsenic, a toxic heavy metal–a practice that
Purdue promptly discontinued when Kenner threatened to include it in his ﬁlm
(National Public Radio, 2009).
In spite of all the evidence that the market for processed foods has arrived at
an equilibrium in which certain aspects of quality are diﬃcult for the consumer
to discern, the magnitude of the purported market breakdown (measured in
lost social welfare) is likely to depend critically on real consequences for human
health. Given that the populace no longer suﬀers from pellagra or scurvy, it
could be argued that the concerns of consumers about health consequences
have little basis in reality. In this case, eﬃciency might indeed simply dictate
producing foods at the lowest possible cost. Below we brieﬂy discuss two modern
by-products of food processing technology that appear to have had large impacts
on public health: trans-fats and reﬁned carbohydrates.
3.1 Trans-fat Century: Hydrogenation and Heart Disease
The eﬀects of particular dietary constituents on human health are both more
complicated–and less well-understood–than the popular conception of nutrition
would suggest. Consider, for instance, the historical (but still ongoing) debate
over dietary causes of obesity, diabetes, and heart disease. While much of this
debate has taken place at the level of macronutrients (protein/carbohydrate/fat),
or the even more reductive “calories in vs. calories out,”16 it is becoming in-
creasingly clear that macronutrient quality is perhaps the most important di-
etary determinant of health outcomes. At the same time, a pattern is emerging:
diet-related health outcomes have been linked repeatedly to particular food pro-
cessing technologies long thought to be safe, or even nutritionally superior. To
illustrate some of the critical subtleties of these ﬁndings, consider some of the
evidence on dietary fat.
16This last perspective has been a favorite in economic studies of obesity, which have tended
to focus on the inﬂuence of changes in (various measures of) the implicit “price of a calorie”
on body weight (e.g., Cutler et al. (2003); Chou et al. (2004)).
15Although dietary fat has long been blamed as a leading cause of obesity and
heart disease, there is now a growing consensus that total dietary fat intake has
little demonstrable eﬀect on health outcomes.17 Rather, the strongest evidence
from both clinical and epidemiological studies now points to the trans-fatty
acids–found in many margarines and vegetable shortenings–is the form of dietary
fat most conducive to heart disease.18 And again, trans-fats are primarily a
product of industrial food processing: nearly all trans-fats in the American diet
are the product of the partial hydrogenation of vegetable oils, a process that
generates a chemically stable, low-cost substitute for lard and butter (Unnevehr
and Jagmanaite, 2008).
Another side eﬀect of hydrogenation that has been attracting attention of
late is the selective destruction of omega-3 fatty acids. While there is widespread
scientiﬁc agreement that human health is harmed by current levels of trans-fats
in the U.S. food supply, there is also a growing body of evidence suggesting that
health outcomes would be improved if omega-3s were more widely consumed.
Omega-3 fatty acids are one of two types of polyunsaturated essential fatty
acids (the other being omega-6), distinguished by their chemical structures.
Both are essential components of the diet (i.e., they are necessary to sustain
human life, and neither can be synthesized by the human body from other com-
pounds), and are thought to aﬀect blood lipids in a way that decreases the risk
of heart disease (Mensink et al., 2003). Omega-3 fatty acids are also thought
to be uniquely eﬀective in preventing cardiac deaths (Valagussa et al., 1999;
Leaf, 2007; Yokoyama et al., 2007). While the pre-industrial ratio of omega-6
to omega-3 in the diet is thought to have been on the order of 1:1, the modern
ratio is around 11:1 (Eaton et al., 1997).19 The reasons for this are related
to the nature of omega-3s. They are found primarily in ﬁsh and green plants
but also some nuts and seeds. Most signiﬁcantly, omega-3 fatty acids are more
susceptible to oxidation and spoilage than their omega-6 counterparts. For this
reason, vegetable oils (such as soybean oil) containing signiﬁcant amounts of
omega-3s are not well-suited for use in mass-marketed processed foods (which
often require long-term storage without refrigeration), and are typically hydro-
genated for use as shortening (Allport, 2006). In other words, the shortage
of omega-3s in the American diet appears to be yet another unfortunate–and
apparently deadly–side eﬀect of modern food processing technology.
17Taubes (2007) provides an excellent review of the scientiﬁc debate over the dietary causes
of obesity, diabetes, and heart disease, which has been conducted historically on the basis of
surprisingly weak evidence. Nevertheless, a consensus emerged–and was for a time incorpo-
rated into oﬃcial U.S. dietary guidelines encouraging consumers to “eat sparingly” of fats and
oils–because of a desire to convey a simple message to consumers, and perhaps also for reasons
of political economy (Nestle, 2007).
18Trans-fats are thought to increase low density lipoproteins (“bad cholesterol”) while de-
creasing high density lipoproteins (“good cholesterol”) in the bloodstream. Epidemiological
estimates suggest that eliminating trans-fats from the U.S. food supply could prevent between
6 and 19 percent of heart attacks and related deaths (Mozaﬀarian et al., 2006).
19Some researchers argue that the ratio of these two types of fats is more important than
absolute intakes, implying that a reduction in omega-6 might be beneﬁcial under current
circumstances (see Allport (2006) for an extended discussion). Others, however, have failed
to detect such an eﬀect in epidemiological studies (Mozaﬀarian et al., 2005; Willett, 2007)
16Though reasonably deﬁnitive evidence on the eﬀects of trans-fatty acids on
human health was published by the early 1990s (see Mensink and Katan, 1990;
Zock and Katan, 1992; Judd et al., 1994), industry resistance to a trans-fat
labeling requirement was ﬁerce. The eventual implementation of such a require-
ment20 required changes beginning in 2006, however, stands as a prominent
demonstration of both the American consumer’s desire for a healthy diet and
the ability of the industry to respond with new production technologies. This
new rule requires all foods with a nutrition label to list grams of trans-fat per
serving, and provides consumers with a simple decision rule (i.e., avoid all prod-
ucts containing trans-fats). It has resulted in the en masse re-formulation of
virtually every trans-fat-containing food product on the market (Unnevehr and
Jagmanaite, 2008). That this transformation took place nearly a century after
the widespread adoption of partially hydrogenated vegetable oils is a lesson that
should not be lost in future eﬀorts to remedy the hidden quality problem with
respect to novel food products.
3.2 Reﬁned Carbohydrates and the Glycemic Response
Proponents of the “glycemic hypothesis” suggest that rather than fats or sug-
ars or calories, the most important dietary determinant of a number of chronic
diseases (including obesity and diabetes) is carbohydrate quality, where quality
is measured by blood sugar response in the minutes and hours following inges-
tion. Experimental studies have demonstrated that following consumption of
reﬁned carbohydrates,21 human subjects experience a predictable sequence of
physiological events: ﬁrst, blood sugar levels rise dramatically; followed by a
proportional increase in circulating levels of insulin, which in turn induces a
number of physiological changes that have the collective eﬀect of bringing blood
sugar back into the normal range. In extreme cases, this sequence of events can
lead paradoxically to a period of low blood sugar many minutes or hours after
the meal, during which the subject typically reports feelings of hunger or crav-
ings for sweets. The strength of the glycemic response can vary from person to
person. Moreover, no simple formula predicts the glycemic eﬀect of a particular
food, though it is known to vary with ﬁber content, particle size, preparation
method, chewing speed, and even the combination of foods included in the
meal (Ludwig 2002). Nevertheless, this physiological response has been docu-
mented repeatedly in both animal and human studies, and chronic consumption
of low-quality (i.e., high-glycemic index) carbohydrates has been shown in large
epidemiological studies to be associated with insulin resistance (diabetes) and
obesity (Willett et al., 2002; Isganaitis and Lustig, 2005).
This phenomenon is remarkable in part because it represents a clear exam-
ple of the endogeneity of dietary intake with respect to dietary quality (i.e.,
20Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and
Health Claim Rule was issued by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration in 2003.
21Reﬁned carbohydrates are generally understood to include sugar- or starch-containing
foods such as sugar, ﬂour, and white rice that have been machine-processed to make them
more easily digestible (Taubes, 2007).
17the consumption of high-glycemic index foods appears to cause people to in-
gest more calories, ceteris paribus). But more importantly, a consumer who
lacks schooling in the endocrinology of digestion might not correctly attribute
his feelings of hunger to the carbohydrate meal ingested hours earlier, not to
mention the possibility that it might be related to the development of diabetes
many years later. It also represents yet another instance in which food pro-
cessing technologies appear to degrade nutritional quality: reﬁned white ﬂour,
for instance, with its small particle size and lack of ﬁber (Table 3), tends to
induce a stronger glycemic response than simple stone ground whole grain ﬂour
(Ludwig, 2002). Eﬀorts to develop a labeling standard for glycemic eﬀects have
thus far met with little success.
4 Toward a More Eﬃcient Market for Processed
Foods
Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the
interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so far as it
may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer.
(Adam Smith (1776, p. 159))
...the restoration of biological normality by the removal of an ab-
normal exposure (e.g., stopping smoking, controlling air pollution,
moderating some of our recently-acquired dietary deviations); here
there can be some presumption of safety.
(Geoﬀrey Rose (1985, p. 38))
Placed in historical context, it becomes apparent that the modern Amer-
ican epidemic of diet-related chronic illness is–at least in part–the product of
a fundamental failure of the mass market to deliver high quality foods to the
consumer. While developments in food processing have provided beneﬁts such
as lower costs, pathogen reduction, long term storage, and wide distribution,
these beneﬁts have come with concomitant costs. To be sure, there have been
a number of notably successful food quality standards implemented over the
years–witness, for example, the resounding recent successes of both the national
organic standard and the mandatory inclusion of trans-fats content on product
labels. But the speed and magnitude with which the market has reacted to the
implementation of these rules can also be taken as evidence that in the absence
of policy interventions (in the form of credible third-party quality veriﬁcation),
lemons problems will persist.22
Given our diagnosis of the nature of the market failure in the American retail
market for food, we now turn to the question of an appropriate policy response.
We begin by proposing two broad principles for such an undertaking.
22Another telling symptom of a sizable “missing market” for high quality foods is to be
found in the burgeoning “buy local” movement–in which consumers are increasingly choosing
to opt out of the national market in search of greater quality and greater transparency (U.S.
Department of Agriculture, 2010).
181. First, any new food policies should take seriously the above-quoted words
of Adam Smith, and place the interests of the consumer ﬁrst. We mean this
not in the focus group, ask-them-what-they-like-to-eat sense, but rather,
we would argue that policymakers should take seriously the evidence that
the American consumer has always gravitated toward healthy foods when
convinced they were so. If an eﬃcient market is the goal, then priority
should be placed on revealing (in an easily accessible manner) to consumers
product qualities that are most likely to be conducive to long-term good
health.
2. Second, adopt the “precautionary principle.”23 Food policy should be con-
servative, as suggested by epidemiologists Peter Cleave (1956) and (later)
Geoﬀrey Rose (1985, quoted above), who emphasized the dangers of adopt-
ing population-level public health policies that might have unanticipated
negative eﬀects. By conservative, we mean what Rose meant: when the
scientiﬁc questions are unresolved, err on the side of what is natural.
Our arrival at these two principles seems, we admit, somewhat anti-climactic.
After delving into the many technicalities and historical particulars of the po-
litical economy of food and health in America, our advice boils down to simple
common sense: markets should serve consumers, and care should be exercised
when imposing novel foodstuﬀs on the populace.
It is unsurprising that we are not the ﬁrst to arrive at these commonsense
principles. In many ways they echo the intentions of the 1906 and 1938 U.S. food
laws, and they are explicitly applied in many speciﬁc regulations in Europe.24
But in practice, at the federal level, American food quality standards have
tended to target only the lowest of quality levels, and in some cases enforcement
of standards has become weaker over time (e.g., the 1973 relaxation of the
“imitation” rule).
Indeed, we suspect that what may be most surprising to many readers is
the manner in which food policy has diverged from our commonsense directives.
Asymmetric information appears to have long been a key strategic objective
for many players in the American food industry, and history is replete with
examples of powerful interests aﬀecting the rules and regulations under which
23The precautionary principle has been widely adopted in food and health policy (e.g.,
GMO foods) and environmental policy (climate change) for use when there are signiﬁcant
scientiﬁc uncertainties and large, potentially irreversible risks. A widely used deﬁnition of
the precautionary principle is found in Article 15 of the Rio Declaration of 1992: “In order
to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack
of full scientiﬁc certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-eﬀective measures
to prevent [environmental degradation].”
24For example, Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 January 1997 requires that novel foods for which there is no history of consumption
in the E.U. must undergo a pre-market approval process that seeks to address the potential
long-term eﬀects of consumption. Similarly, Regulation (EC) No. 1925/2006 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 regulates the addition of vitamins and
minerals and of certain other substances to foods. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing
us to these examples.
19food products are produced and sold. We conclude, therefore, by speaking
directly to the systemic problem of industry inﬂuence in the coming debate over
an improved national food policy.
Among the central lessons of the worldwide ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 was the
danger posed by purveyors of complex ﬁnancial products in the marketplace.
We see strong parallels between this problem–in which even very sophisticated
buyers found themselves purchasing ﬁnancial products laden with hidden costs
and risks of which they were unaware–and the problem with the American mar-
ket for food. Just as banks have competed to market ever-more-complex credit
card contracts (containing ever-more-diﬃcult-to-discern contingencies and fees),
food companies have endeavored to create ever-more-complex food products,
with implications for human health that the typical consumer has little chance
of discerning. In both cases, an absence of standards has given sellers incentive
to engage in obfuscation, and may have played a signiﬁcant role in generating
a “lemons” outcome characterized by uniformly low levels of quality.
In response to the ﬁnancial crisis and the problems of obfuscation and regu-
latory capture in the market for ﬁnancial products, consumer advocates called
for–and the U.S. Congress recently established–a new Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau.25 In justifying the new bureau, advocates noted that the con-
ﬂicted dual mission (i.e., protecting the interests of both the consumer and the
banking industry) of our previous regulatory regime had facilitated agency cap-
ture and resulted in a general neglect of consumer protections (Warren, 2007).
Given the strong parallels to our present system of regulating retail food mar-
kets (in which the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug
Administration are tasked with serving both the consumer and the producers of
foods...and have often seemingly favored the latter), we are making an analo-
gous proposal: the establishment of a new Food Quality Standards Agency. The
mission of such an agency should, in the interest of restoring eﬃciency to our
food markets, be built upon the two principles discussed above. By focusing on
ensuring that consumers have easy access to clear and honest information about
the potential health implications of consuming particular classes of processed
foods, such an agency would give consumers the opportunity to make better
informed choices. If successful, the labeling rules that stem from such a process
will necessarily be simple. For example, the agency might reinstate and enforce
something like the 1938 “imitation” rule, or develop a product certiﬁcation pro-
gram akin to the national organic standard but more closely aligned with health
outcomes. A “heritage foods” standard for minimally-processed foods might go
a long way toward facilitating competition in production of higher-quality foods
within the industrial production and distribution system.
In order to insulate the new agency from the possibility of future capture by
industry interests, it should be endowed with the same four attributes endorsed
by advocates of an independent ﬁnancial agency (Garofalo, 2010):
1. A leader appointed by the president and conﬁrmed by the Senate;
25The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was signed into law
July 21, 2010.
202. independent budget authority,
3. independent rule-making authority; and
4. independent enforcement powers.
These measures will collectively ensure that the new “food watchdog” agency we
propose will be protected from the whims of Congress or future administrations,
and will have the power to enact reforms that will facilitate both innovation
and price competition in markets for higher-quality food products. It is not
often that enactment of a single public policy has the potential to both improve
market eﬃciency and prevent millions of premature deaths, but after more than
a century of neglect, the modern American market for food presents just such
an opportunity.
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1810 “Canning” (heating and sealing food in an airtight container) developed by
Nicolas Appert. Napoleon needed to feed a traveling army and oﬀered a prize
of 12,000 francs in 1800 to anyone who could create foods to feed his army.
After some 15 years of experimentation, Appert was awarded the prize in 1810
(Jay et al. 2005, p. 4)
1837 Pasteur shows that the souring of milk is caused by microorganisms (Jay et
al. 2005, p. 4)
1856 U.S. Patent for unsweetened condensed milk awarded to Gail Borden. (Jay et
al. 2005, p. 5)
1860 Pasteur shows that heating destroys undesirable organisms in wine and beer
(Jay et al. 2005, p. 4)
1869 Union and Central Paciﬁc Railroads join their rails to complete nation’s ﬁrst
transcontinental railroad (http://www.nps.gov/gosp, retrieved 4/19/2010).
First refrigerated box car of fresh fruit shipped east from California. In the
following decade, newly established rail networks facilitate delivery of hothouse
produce to large cities. New longer-lasting peach variety ships from Georgia
to northern cities. (Levenstein 1988, p. 30-31).
Liebig’s Soluble Food for Babies introduced in the United States.
1870 Advent of roller mills makes white ﬂour aﬀordable for working class households
(Davidson and Passmore 1963).
1870s New technique of packing under steam pressure makes large-scale canning
and pickling feasible. The H.J. Heinz Company is among the ﬁrst to take
advantage of the new technology, soon claiming to produce “57 Varieties” of
preserved foods. Heinz invests aggressively in advertising and promotion of its
brands, including a popular display at the 1893 Chicago World’s Fair (where
more than one million attendees receive free samples and a green metallic
Heinz pickle charm), a six-story-tall electrically illuminated sign (the ﬁrst of
its kind) in New York, and the opening of the Heinz Pier in Atlantic City in
1899 (Levenstein 1988, p. 36).
1875-1900 Reports of “infantile scurvy” (now known to be caused by Vitamin C deﬁciency)
become increasingly common. Observers have since noted that the use of
evaporated and condensed milk (in which most Vitamin C is destroyed by
heat during processing) as food for infants increased dramatically over this
period of time (Kiple and Ornelas 2000, p. 997).
1879 Gustavus Swift develops system that allows beef to be fattened and slaughtered
in Chicago, then shipped east in refrigerated railroad cars fresh, dressed, and
cheaper than beef on the hoof (Levenstein 1988, p. 31). By the mid-1880s,
it was said that the “Golden Age of American Beef” had arrived (Levenstein
1988, p. 32).
1880s Newly arisen competitive market for reﬁned sugar spawns formation of a “sugar
trust” (the American Sugar Reﬁning Company), which uses market power to
eliminate competition and maintain higher prices. The trust also successfully
convinces the public that brown sugar is unsafe to eat. Between 1880 and
1915, per capita consumption of white granulated sugar doubles (Levenstein
1988, p. 33).
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Late 1880s Rail used for daily delivery of fresh milk, fruits, and vegetables to exurban
areas of Middle Atlantic and Great Lakes states. Milk sold from American
farms rises from 2 billion pounds per year in 1870 to more than 18 billion in
1900 (Levenstein 1988, pp. 30-31).
1890 Commercial pasteurization of milk begins (Jay et al. 2005, p. 5)
Experiments in which chickens are fed polished rice provide the ﬁrst evidence
that beriberi is a disease of malnutrition. Beriberi had become widespread in
Southeast Asia after the introduction of the steam-powered rice mill in 1870
(Dunn 2000, pp. 914, 918 in Kiple and Ornelas 2000).
1891 Federal meat inspection law passed with support from the large meat packers,
pre-empting more restrictive state-speciﬁc rules (Levenstein 1988, p. 38)
1893 Certiﬁed Milk movement started by H.I. Coit in New Jersey (Jay et al. 2005,
p. 5)
1898 J.T. Torrance develops method of condensing soups, making canned soups
less bulky; founds Joseph P. Campbell Company, maker of Campbell’s Soups
(Levenstein 1988, p. 37).
1899 National Biscuit Company (a.k.a. Nabisco) introduces the “Uneeda Cracker.”
Nabisco eventually captured 70 percent of the market, via a series of mergers
of large manufacturers, replacement of generic cracker barrels with sanitary-
looking packages, and an aggressive sales and advertising campaign (Leven-
stein 1988, p. 35).
1900 Food processing industry accounts for 20 percent of U.S. manufacturing. Of
the top four sectors of the industry–meat packing, ﬂour milling, sugar reﬁning,
and baking–only baking (with the exception of cracker-baking) is not domi-
nated by a few large corporations (Levenstein 1988, pp. 37-38).
1900s Post, and then Kellogg’s, invest heavily in national advertising campaigns,
which succeed in convincing American consumers to switch from meat-based
breakfasts to packaged products made from highly processed grains. Health
and hygiene are among the most prominent messages included in these ads as
reasons for the switch (Levenstein 1988, pp. 33-34).
1903 Iceberg lettuce introduced. Called “virtually indestructible,” the new variety
can be shipped long distances without bruising or wilting (Levenstein 1988, p.
31).
German chemist Wilhelm Norman ﬁles a patent for the “conversion of un-
saturated fatty acids...into saturated compounds” by hydrogenation (Allport
2006).
1906 The Meat Inspection Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act (new, tougher
federal meat inspection and food labeling laws establishing the Food and Drug
Administration) are enacted, partly in response to the publication of Upton
Sinclair’s The Jungle. H.J. Heinz and other large canners initially oppose, then
support the legislation when it becomes clear that federal oversight is needed
to assuage consumer fears about the safety of processed foods (Levenstein
1988, p. 39).
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1907 The ﬁrst systematic description of pellagra (a disease now known to be caused
by niacin deﬁciency) is published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association. Within months, thousands of cases are diagnosed, mostly among
the poor in southern states where the diet consists primarily of cornmeal and
generally lacks milk or meat (Kiple and Ornelas 2000, p. 962).
1910 Procter & Gamble develops and patents a new vegetable shortening to compete
with lard and butter in home cooking. The patent application stated that “This
invention is a food product consisting of a vegetable oil, preferably cottonseed
oil, partially hydrogenised, and hardened to a homogenous white or yellowish
semi-solid closely resembling lard. The special object of the invention is to
provide a new food product for a shortening in cooking...” By 1912, Crisco was
being widely advertised as “An absolutely new product–a scientiﬁc discovery
which will aﬀect every kitchen in America” (Schisgall 1981, p. 71-72)
New York City Board of Health issues an order requiring the pasteurization
of milk (Jay et al. 2005, p. 8). Many other cities follow suit a few years later
(Levenstein 1988, p. 41).
1912 Funk discovers the existence and critical nutritional role of “vitamines” in
food (Funk 1912). In the following decade, several individual nutrients are
identiﬁed, and their importance to human health is gradually established.
(Levenstein 1993, p. 13).
1914 In U.S. v. Lexington Mill and Elevator Company, the Supreme Court is-
sues its ﬁrst ruling on food additives. It ruled that in order for bleached
ﬂour with nitrite residues to be banned from foods, the government must
show a relationship between the chemical additive and the harm it al-
legedly caused in humans. The court also noted that the mere pres-
ence of such an ingredient was not suﬃcient to render the food illegal
(http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html, accessed 11/19/08).
Reports of the successful treatment of pellagra by dietary modiﬁcation are
published (Kiple and Ornelas 2000, p. 963).
1915 Billboard campaign (sponsored by ﬂour millers) encourages consumers to “Eat
More Wheat” (Levenstein 1988, p. 43).
1923 Procter & Gamble begins radio advertising of Crisco, sponsoring “Crisco Cook-
ing Talks,” in which various speakers read recipes that call for the use of Crisco
(Schisgall 1981, p. 122).
1925 Continental Baking acquires Wonder Bread, transforming it into a national
brand. (http://www.wonderbread.com, accessed 2/9/09)
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1928-1938 Elmer McCollum, the most widely known nutrition researcher in the U.S.,
warns that white ﬂour has been deprived of most of its vitamin content. In 1930
McCollum is hired by General Mills to promote its consumption; in 1934 he
appears on a heavily-promoted Betty Crocker radio special to assure the public
that white ﬂour promotes good health (and weight loss); in 1935 he writes
a well-publicized letter to Congress denouncing “the pernicious teachings of
food faddists who have sought to make people afraid of white-ﬂour bread” and
provides the canning industry with a statement assuring the public nutrition
science supported “the high favor of canned goods among consumers.” In 1938,
McCollum received an award from the Grocery Manufacturers Association for
his contributions to knowledge of food (Schlink 1935, Levenstein 1993, p. 22).
1929 Clarence Birdseye sells his method of ﬂash-freezing foods to General Foods.
The subsequent stock market crash and events that follow limit the size of the
frozen food market until after World War II (Levenstein 1993 pp. 106-107).
1930-1938 In response to concerns about inconsistent quality in canned foods (including
the notorious case of a druggist whose patent medicine killed seventy-three
people in seven states; his only punishment under the existing law was a two-
hundred-dollar ﬁne), Congress considers updating the 1906 Food and Drug
Act. The large food processors strongly oppose the bill (after initially sup-
porting a measure that would label substandard fare “Below U.S. Standard,
Low Quality but Not Illegal”), reportedly both because the proposed penal-
ties for false and misleading advertising would preclude the use of extravagant
health claims in marketing new products, and because proposed federal quality
grading would diminish the importance of large advertising budgets and brand
names (thus making it easier for smaller producers to gain market share). An-
other important voice speaking in opposition to these regulations is that of the
mass circulation magazines (by the mid-1930s, the food industries had become
their largest advertisers)
1930-1939 Procter & Gamble expands radio advertising of Crisco with the popular “Sisters
of the Skillet” program. Two large radio networks (formed by National Broad-
casting Company and the Columbia Broadcasting System) now cover dozens
of cities. The campaign continues through the Great Depression, and sales of
Crisco triple between 1933 and 1939. Procter & Gamble maintains Crisco’s
dominant market share throughout the 20th century, in part by continually
improving its formulation in response to pressure from competing products
(Schisgall 1981, p. 122, 125, 138).
1937 Niacin (then called nicotinic acid) shown to be the critical limiting nutrient in
a study of blacktongue (the canine equivalent of pellagra) in dogs (Kiple and
Ornelas 2000, p. 965).
1939 The American Medical Association recommends “restoring” processed foods
with nutrients to bring them back to their “high natural levels” (Levenstein
1993, p. 22).
Continued on next page
31Table 2 – continued from previous page
Year Event
Late 1930s After years of debate over whether to require pasteurization (as opposed to
certiﬁcation) to ensure the safety of liquid milk, a public relations campaign
sponsored by large milk producers (including most prominently the National
Dairy Products Company–later re-named Kraft–and the Borden Company)
succeeds in convincing the public that raw (unpasteurized) milk can never be
safe to drink. Many states subsequently pass laws banning the sale of raw milk;
as a result, pasteurization quickly becomes the norm for interstate commerce
(Schmid 2003, pp. 146-147).
1941 Enriched ﬂour standards established by federal government. Because many
states subsequently require enrichment of reﬁned ﬂour, the practice quickly
becomes the norm for interstate commerce (Levenstein 1993, p. 22).
1941-1953 The proportion of household income spent on food increases–in apparent con-
tradiction of Engel’s Law–from 22% to 26%. Fortune magazine declares that
“Of all the violent upheavals that have shaken and transformed the American
market, none (has) been bigger, or more baﬄing, than those aﬀecting food,”
going on to explain that the biggest change is the now-ubiquitous presence of
processed foods in American kitchens: “One out of ﬁve home-made cups of
coﬀee drunk in the U.S. today is made from a soluble preparation. In many
supermarkets you can now buy a complete turkey dinner, frozen, apportioned,
packaged. Just heat and serve” (Levenstein 1993, p. 101).
1949-1959 Thanks to frozen concentrated orange juice, Swanson’s heat-and-serve “TV
dinners,” self-service chest freezers in supermarkets, and newly aﬀordable home
freezers, consumer expenditures on frozen foods increase 2700 percent. During
this period (dubbed “the Golden Age of Food Processing”), food chemists also
develop over four hundred new additives for use in processing and preserving
food. Innovations included food coloring, the ﬂavor-enhancer monosodium
glutamate (MSG) and strawberry-ﬂavored Jell-O. The trade-oﬀ between taste
and production eﬃciency in processed foods is widely acknowledged in trade
publications, though rarely mentioned in consumer magazines (Better Homes
and Gardens featured a “These Foods are News!” column from 1959 to 1961)
(Levenstein 1993, pp. 107-111).
1950 The Oleomargarine Act requires prominent labeling of colored oleomargarine,
to distinguish it from butter. The Delaney Committee starts congressional
investigation of the safety of chemicals in foods and cosmetics, laying the
foundation for the 1954 Miller Pesticide Amendment, the 1958 Food Addi-
tives Amendment (requiring manufacturers of new food additives to estab-
lish safety; the Delaney proviso prohibits the approval of any food additive
shown to induce cancer in humans or animals), and the 1960 Color Addi-
tive Amendment. Upon passage of the 1958 Act, the deputy commissioner
of the Food and Drug Administration tells the New York State Bar conven-
tion that the FDA intends to use its new authority primarily to reassure the
public about the safety of processed foods (Levenstein 1993, pp. 112-113;
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html, accessed 11/19/08).
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1950s Kraft Television Theater, an immensely popular live television drama, features
commercials for such products as Miracle Whip, Kraft marshmallows, Kraft
caramels, Velveeta, and Cheese Whiz; convenience is emphasized (one recipe
for “Cheese Rabbit,” a quick one-dish dinner, consists of a jar of Cheese Whiz
mixed with a can of kidney beans, onion, pepper, margarine, ketchup, and
Worcestershire sauce) (Levenstein 1993 p. 116).
1951 Herbert Dutton shows that linolenic acid (an omega-3 fatty acid) is the cause
of the oﬀ ﬂavors and odors in soybean oil, leading to the expanded use of
partial or selective hydrogenation to eliminate this fat (Allport 2006).
Coast-to-coast transmission of television broadcasting becomes possible; Proc-
ter & Gamble’s award-winning nighttime drama “Fireside Theater” (later re-
named “The Jane Wyman Show”) transmitted by 94 stations. Crisco is featured
prominently, along with various soap products (Schisgall 1981, p. 190)
1958 704 chemicals are now commonly added to foods (Levenstein 1993, p. 112).
The FDA publishes in the Federal Register the ﬁrst list of substances gen-
erally recognized as safe (GRAS). The list contains nearly 200 substances
(http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html, accessed 11/19/08).
1959 The H.J. Heinz Company publishes the Heinz Handbook of Nutrition, which
warns that “discussions of modern methods of food manufacture inevitably
highlight partial losses of a number of valuable nutrients during process-
ing...while the large number of advantages are ignored or taken for granted.”
The advantages listed include processed infant food, which provides “essential
nutrients seldom supplied before when they were needed most” (Levenstein
1993, p. 112).
1964 Ralph Holman proposes the “omega” system for naming the diﬀerent families
of fatty acids; prior to this (and for several years after) most analysis of dietary
fat neglected to distinguish between the various forms of fatty acids (Allport
2006).
1966 Fair Packaging and Labeling Act requires all consumer products in in-
terstate commerce to be “honestly and informatively labeled,” with the
FDA enforcing provisions on foods, drugs, cosmetics, and medical devices
(http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html, accessed 11/19/08).
1967 Trout raised with corn oil as the only fat in their diet develop a shock syndrome
and suﬀer a high mortality. Trout are the ﬁrst animal to be recognized as
requiring omega-3 fatty acids (Allport 2006).
1973 FDA issues regulations repealing the 1938 “imitation” rule prohibiting sub-
stantial changes to traditional foods without explicit notice on the label. The
move is supported by the American Heart Association (because it would fa-
cilitate the reformulation of many foods to reduce levels of saturated fat) and
the food processing lobby (Pollan 2008, p. 35).
1974-1975 High sugar prices (1974) and expiration (1975) of the patented production
process for high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) spawn a dramatic shift away
from sucrose (sugar) as the caloric sweetener of choice in processed foods
(http://www.hfcs55.com/hfcs-in-usa/, accessed 2/7/09).
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1976 The Vitamins and Minerals Amendments (“Proxmire Amendments”) stop
FDA from establishing standards limiting potency of vitamins and miner-
als in food supplements or regulating them as drugs based solely on potency
(http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html, accessed 11/19/08).
1977 A U.S. Senate committee chaired by George McGovern issues Dietary Goals
for the United States, which call for decreased consumption of red meat and
dairy products. These industries express outrage, and the goals are rewritten
to say “choose meats, poultry, and ﬁsh that will reduce saturated fat intake”
(Pollan 2008, p. 23).
1982 Ralph Holman and his colleagues report that the neurological symptoms of
a patient living on a total parenteral nutrition formula are caused by a deﬁ-
ciency of omega-3 fatty acids. Omega-3s come to be recognized as essential for
humans (as well as trout), but it’s thought to be almost impossible to make
someone deﬁcient in this widespread nutrient (Allport 2006).
1989 Dennis Hoﬀman is the ﬁrst of a number of investigators to ﬁnd signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the visual and mental acuity of infants raised on formulas with
and without omega-3 fatty acids (Allport 2006).
1990 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act requires all packaged foods to bear
nutrition labeling and all health claims for foods to be consistent with
terms deﬁned by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The law
preempts state requirements about food standards, nutrition labeling, and
health claims and, for the ﬁrst time, authorizes some health claims for
foods. The food ingredient panel, serving sizes, and terms such as “low
fat” and “light” are standardized; the requirement is implemented in 1992.
(http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html, accessed 11/19/08).
1990-1994 Three studies demonstrating the eﬀect of trans-fats on blood lipids (and thus,
presumably, heart disease) published (Mensink and Katan 1990, Zock and
Katan 1992, Judd et al. 1994).
1996 The Food Quality Protection Act amends the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act, eliminating application of the Delaney proviso to pesticides
(http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html, accessed 11/19/08).
1998 Folic acid added to enriched ﬂour standards (CDC 2004).
1999 First published report suggesting that omega-3 fatty acids can prevent sudden
cardiac death (GISSI 1999).
2002 David Ludwig publishes article in Journal of the American Medical Association
(JAMA) reviewing evidence that reﬁned carbohydrates are a likely cause of
chronic diseases such as obesity, diabetes, and heart disease.
2003 To help consumers choose “heart-healthy” foods, the Department of Health and
Human Services announces that FDA will require food labels to include trans-
fat content, the ﬁrst substantive change to the nutrition facts panel on foods
since the label was changed in 1993. The rule goes into eﬀect in January 2006
(http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html, accessed 11/19/08).
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2004 Passage of the Food Allergy Labeling and Consumer Protection Act requires
the labeling of any food that contains a protein derived from any one of the
following foods that, as a group, account for the vast majority of food aller-
gies: peanuts, soybeans, cow’s milk, eggs, ﬁsh, crustacean shellﬁsh, tree nuts,
and wheat (http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html, accessed
11/19/08).
2007 Omega-3 fatty acids shown to prevent sudden cardiac death (Leaf 2007,
Yokoyama et al. 2007).
35Table 3: Food Processing and Nutrition
Processed Food Changes in nutritional quality
induced by processing
White Sugar* 98.8% decrease in calcium
(relative to brown) 98.8% decrease in iron
98.5% decrease in potassium
100.0% decrease in niacin
Iceberg Lettuce* 43% decrease in ﬁber
(relative to Romaine) 58% decrease in iron
35% decrease in zinc
88% decrease in vitamin C
63% decrease in riboﬂavin
61% decrease in niacin
43% decrease in vitamin B-6
79% decrease in folate
94% decrease in beta-carotene
Canned Tomatoes* 27% decrease in vitamin C
(relative to fresh) 84% decrease in beta-carotene
2760% increase in sodium
Dried Tomatoes (dry wt.)* 27% decrease in vitamin C
(relative to fresh) 71% decrease in folate
Fresh Tomatoes grown in 1999** 17% decrease in vitamin C
(relative to 1950) 43% decrease in vitamin A
55% decrease in calcium
25% decrease in iron
Canned Apples (sweetened, drained)* 29% decrease in ﬁber
(relative to fresh) 91% decrease in vitamin C
47% decrease in thiamine
62% decrease in riboﬂavin
20% decrease in niacin
19% decrease in beta-carotene
200% increase in sodium
44% increase in sugar
White Flour* 78% decrease in ﬁber
(relative to whole wheat ﬂour) 70% decrease in iron
73% decrease in thiamine
81% decrease in riboﬂavin
80% decrease in niacin
87% decrease in vitamin B-6
41% decrease in folate
63% decrease in monounsaturated fatty acids
47% decrease in polyunsaturated fatty acids
Enriched White Flour* 78% decrease in ﬁber
(relative to whole wheat ﬂour) 63% decrease in monounsaturated fatty acids
47% decrease in polyunsaturated fatty acids
White Rice* 56% decrease in iron
(relative to brown rice) 83% decrease in thiamine
63% decrease in niacin
72% decrease in vitamin B-6
55% decrease in folate
81% decrease in monounsaturated fatty acids
84% decrease in polyunsaturated fatty acids
Beef (grain-fed)*** 38% decrease in omega-3 fatty acids
(relative to grass-fed) 78% increase in omega-6:omega-3 ratio
Sources:
*USDA 2008 and authors’ calculations
**Davis et al. 2004 and authors’ calculations
***French et al. 2000 and authors’ calculations
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